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Abstract 
We explore the relationship between commercialisation and gender for groundnuts in Eastern 
Province, Zambia, using a mixed methods approach. Women saw themselves as having greater 
control over groundnuts than other crops, and both sexes saw groundnuts as controlled by women. 
Focus Group Discussions reported higher levels of control than found in a household survey. 
Propensity Score Matching showed that the machine shelling and higher sales did not reduce 
women’s perceived level of control over groundnuts. Women welcomed greater male participation 
in machine shelling because it reduced the drudgery of shelling by hand. This suggests that 
commercialisation did not disempower women. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
   
 
1. Introduction 
The commercialisation of food crops is widely believed to disempower women. Traditional 
gender roles view women as the providers of food and men as the providers of wage goods. 
When food crops become commercialised, these gender roles conflict. As gender studies 
illustrate, men then assert their role as providers as wage goods to gain control of the income 
from food crops, with women to suppliers of labour. The paradigmatic case is irrigated rice in 
The Gambia, where commercialisation subverted women’s rights to land, increased male control 
over their labour power, and turned women farmers into hired workers (Carney and Watts, 1990, 
1991). The adverse impact of commercialisation on women in The Gambia became a veritable 
cottage industry, and remains the central point of reference on this topic.i In eastern Africa the 
evidence tells a similar story, whether for French beans in Kenya (Dolan, 2001) or hybrid maize 
in Zambia (Kumar, 1994). In short, everything we know suggests that commercialisation is bad 
news for women.  
Two aspects of gender and commercialisation have received particular attention. One is the 
concept of ‘women’s crops’. Historically, Africa was ‘the region of female farming par 
excellence’ (Boserup, 1989).ii  This is no longer true. A survey of cassava-growing areas in six 
SSA countries in 1989-91 revealed that 51% of total labour requirements for root crops, rice and 
maize, were provided primarily by men (Enete et. al., 2002). Likewise, in Ghana no crops were 
grown exclusively by women, whether by households headed by women, or on fields held by 
women, or on fields from which women kept the income (Doss, 2002). Hence, ‘women’s crops’ 
are no longer based on a gender division of labour. By contrast, the concept of ‘women’s crops’ 
has kept its value in terms of the ‘gender division of control’ (Geisler, 1993).  We were alerted to 
this at a recent meeting with women farmers in Zambia (Orr et. al., 2014a). Women working 
alone contribute only 6% of the labour for groundnuts, while men and women working together 
provide 25 % (Mofya-Mukuka and Shipekesa, 2013). However, when we suggested this meant 
that groundnuts was not a ‘women’s crop’, the result was uproar. We were left in no doubt that 
women regarded groundnuts as firmly under their control. 
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The second aspect is the centrality of language. As Chomsky (1979) argues, ‘questions of 
language are basically questions of power’, and this clearly influenced thinking on 
commercialisation and gender in The Gambia.iii Commercialisation leads to disputes over the 
meaning of ‘women’s crops’. Ultimate control belongs to those who have ‘the power to name’ 
(Carney and Watts, 1990: 230). Whoever has the power to specify a crop’s gender attributes also 
has the power to control the product. Thus, the power to name is a litmus test for the impact of 
commercialisation on gender equity.  
This paper explores the process of commercialisation for groundnuts in the Eastern Province, 
Zambia, where groundnuts have historically been regarded as a ‘women’s crop’. Six in ten farm 
households in Eastern Province grow groundnuts, and one-fifth of the harvested crop is sold 
(Mofya-Mukuka and Shipekesa, 2013). Recently, increased demand has resulted in new 
investment in seed production, processing, and grain trading. The Eastern Province Farmers’ 
Cooperative (EPFC) is a farmers’ organisation that buys and sells groundnut seed. Women 
traditionally shell groundnuts by hand but in 2012 EPFC distributed machine shellers to selected 
seed producer groups. Scenting cash, men began to operate these shellers and to claim a greater 
role in decision-making for groundnuts, including a greater share of the income from sales. 
We tested five hypotheses regarding ‘women’s crops’:  
1. Women have greater control over groundnuts than other field crops;  
2. Men and women disagree over the level of women’s control;  
3. The higher women’s share of the workload, the greater women’s control of the crop;  
4. Women maintain control over groundnuts by ceding men control over cotton; and  
5. Machine shelling and commercialisation reduce women’s control over groundnuts. 
To measure control, we developed a simple tool which we applied using a mixed methods 
approach that combined qualitative and quantitative instruments. A Q-squared approach is useful 
for the study of social processes that are difficult to capture using only quantitative methods 
(Davis and Baulch, 2011). However, testing hypotheses about social processes requires 
quantitative data (Gladwin et al., 2002).  
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The paper is divided into six sections. Section two outlines a conceptual framework and section 
three describes our data and methods. Section four presents results while section five discusses 
some implications. Finally, we summarise our conclusions. 
2. Conceptual Framework  
Figure 1 shows a conceptual framework for the analysis of ‘women’s crops’. We hypothesise 
that commercialisation disempowers women because they can no longer enforce their claims to 
access and control. 
INSERT FIGURE 1 HERE 
We distinguish three different types of control. As Doss (2001) argues, ‘women’s crops’ are 
defined not only by who controls the output, but also by ‘who chooses the crops to grow and 
who makes the management decisions’. We define ‘strategic’ control as the power to choose 
‘how’ resources are allocated between competing crops, and ‘operational’ control as the power to 
choose ‘what’ and ‘when’ crop management operations are implemented. Finally, we define 
‘financial’ control as the power to choose ‘who’ receives the realised value or income from the 
crop.  
‘Decision-making’ is the term that social scientists generally use to operationalise ‘control’. The 
standard practice is to identify key decision points, determine what role women play in making 
these decisions, and combine the answers into a single index (Alkire et. al., 2013). In Figure 1, 
we use the concept of ‘decision-making’ to cover decisions about all the three types of control – 
strategic, operational, and financial.   
We distinguish between ‘access’ and ‘control’. ‘Access’ has been defined as ‘the ability to derive 
benefits from things’ (Ribot and Peluso, 2003) which equates access with effective control. 
However, ‘access implies the right to use or benefit from a productive resource; control refers to 
the effective exercise of such rights’ (Berry, 1989). In Figure 1, we define access as the ability to 
use a given resource, without implying control over or the use of benefits.  
Rights and claims’ are the mechanisms by which individuals negotiate ‘access’ and ‘control’. 
Ribot and Peluso (2003) define a right as ‘an enforceable claim’. A ‘right’ is therefore a claim 
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whose validity is recognised by law, custom, or popular opinion, whereas a claim is not so 
recognised. In Africa, rights to property are not indivisible because women and men can have 
rights over different uses of the same plant (Howard and Nabanoga, 2007) or to different 
categories of cattle (Oboler, 1996), or hold rights on behalf of others, as women hold rights in 
cattle for their sons (von Bulow, 1992).  
‘Rights’ and ‘claims’ to control are mobilised in two ways. First, through the ‘conjugal contract’, 
that ‘sets the terms by which husbands and wives exchange goods, income, and services, 
including labour’ (Whitehead, 1981). Like rights, the terms of conjugal contract are not fixed but 
are re-negotiated in response to changing circumstances. Second, they are mobilised by the 
identification of specific ‘gender attributes’, which are culturally defined ways of classifying 
resources in terms of whether they share male or female traits. The social construction of gender 
is expressed in these attributes and in the conjugal contract, which are interlinked. ‘Women’s 
crops’, for example, are defined by feminine attributes, such as their importance for ‘relish’ or a 
balanced meal, and women’s responsibility to provide this part of the household diet then 
becomes part of the conjugal contract (Padmanabhan, 2007).   
3. Data and Methods  
3.1 Measuring ‘women’s ‘control’ 
Figure 2 shows the tool we developed to measure ‘women’s control’.iv The crops (C1 – C4) in 
each quadrant are the crops for which women’s control is compared. The decisions (D1 – D6) are 
the key decisions for crop production and sale for which the degree of women’s control is 
measured. The scores (S1 – S6) measure the degree of control that women have over these key 
decisions. Finally, the weights (W1 – W6) are the relative importance that women give to these 
key decisions (D1 – D6). The weighted scores are aggregated to produce a weighted gender 
control index (WGCI).  
INSERT FIGURE 2 HERE 
The household-level sex-disaggregated weighted gender control index (WGCI) was defined for 
each crop as follows: 
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𝑊𝑊𝑊𝑊𝑊𝑊𝑊𝑊𝑔𝑔 =  ∑ 𝑊𝑊𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑆𝑆𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑘𝑘𝑗𝑗=1∑ 𝑊𝑊𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑘𝑘𝑗𝑗=1   where the subscript j is a decision, k is the number of decisions and g 
refers to either male (husband) or female (in polygamous households, the first-married wife). 
3.2 Qualitative data and methods 
We held focus group discussions (FGDs) with (1) ‘commercial’ groups with more than three 
years’ experience of selling to EPFC (2) ‘commercial sheller’ groups with at least three years’ 
experience with the machine sheller and (3) ‘non-commercial’ groups that had recently joined 
EPFC. We purposively identified six villages with EPFC groups in one of these categories.v To 
ensure a common understanding of ‘control’ we used the Chichewa verb ‘kulamulira’ (‘being in 
charge’). vi FGDs were held separately with men and women. Each FGD scored how much 
control women had over each decision using a scale of 0-100, and a scale of 0-5 for the 
importance of each decision for overall control. Discussions among participants were recorded 
and translated for analysis. 
3.3 Quantitative data and methods 
A household survey was conducted with smallholder farmers in three purposively selected 
villages at least 15 km apart within the same agro-ecological zone. One was the ‘treatment’ 
village where an EPFC group had used a sheller for two seasons, and where we also conducted 
FGDs. The other two were ‘control’ villages without a sheller, in one of which we also 
conducted FGDs. In order to compare perceptions between men and women, only households 
with both male and female adults were selected for interview. Husbands and wives were 
interviewed separately by male and female enumerators, respectively. Within each village, 100 
households were randomly selected for interview, giving a total of 100 households from the 
village with the sheller and 200 households from the two villages without a sheller.  
We collected gender-disaggregated data on the perceived share of workload for different crop 
management operations, including land preparation, planting, fertilizer application, weeding, 
harvesting, stripping (groundnuts only), transport to storage, shelling (groundnuts only), 
winnowing, sorting and grading, and transport to market. These were weighted using data on 
labour requirements from on-station trials in the 2013 crop season, while the time for transport to 
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market was collected from each household. The household-level gender share of workload 
(GSW) can be defined for each crop as follows: 
𝑊𝑊𝐺𝐺𝑊𝑊𝑔𝑔 =  ∑ 𝑤𝑤𝑗𝑗𝑔𝑔𝐺𝐺𝑗𝑗𝑔𝑔𝑘𝑘𝑗𝑗=1∑ 𝑤𝑤𝑗𝑗𝑔𝑔𝑘𝑘𝑗𝑗=1  
where 𝑤𝑤 is the labour requirement, 𝐺𝐺 is the perceived share of workload expressed in percent, the 
subscript j is the stage in the farming process, k is the number of stages involved, and g refers to 
either the husband or the main wife.  
To test hypotheses 1-4, we used univariate and bivariate analysis. Since both WGCI and GSW 
are indicators of perceived levels and the sum of men’s and women’s figures is generally not 
equal to 100, relatively objective indicators of control and workload can be defined by taking the 
average of men’s and women’s perceptions. That is, the relatively objective control indicators for 
women and men can be defined as: 
𝑂𝑂𝑊𝑊𝑊𝑊𝑊𝑊𝑊𝑊𝑓𝑓 =  12 �𝑊𝑊𝑊𝑊𝑊𝑊𝑊𝑊𝑓𝑓 + (100 −𝑊𝑊𝑊𝑊𝑊𝑊𝑊𝑊𝑚𝑚)� 
𝑂𝑂𝑊𝑊𝑊𝑊𝑊𝑊𝑊𝑊𝑚𝑚 =  12 �𝑊𝑊𝑊𝑊𝑊𝑊𝑊𝑊𝑚𝑚 + �100 −𝑊𝑊𝑊𝑊𝑊𝑊𝑊𝑊𝑓𝑓�� 
where 𝑓𝑓 and 𝑚𝑚 refer to female and male, respectively. Likewise, the relatively objective gender 
share of workload can be defined as: 
𝑂𝑂𝑊𝑊𝐺𝐺𝑊𝑊𝑓𝑓 =  12 �𝑊𝑊𝐺𝐺𝑊𝑊𝑓𝑓 + (100 − 𝑊𝑊𝐺𝐺𝑊𝑊𝑚𝑚)� 
𝑂𝑂𝑊𝑊𝐺𝐺𝑊𝑊𝑚𝑚 =  12 �𝑊𝑊𝐺𝐺𝑊𝑊𝑚𝑚 + �100 − 𝑊𝑊𝐺𝐺𝑊𝑊𝑓𝑓�� 
 
Obviously, 𝑂𝑂𝑊𝑊𝑊𝑊𝑊𝑊𝑊𝑊𝑓𝑓 + 𝑂𝑂𝑊𝑊𝑊𝑊𝑊𝑊𝑊𝑊𝑚𝑚 = 𝑂𝑂𝑊𝑊𝐺𝐺𝑊𝑊𝑓𝑓 + 𝑂𝑂𝑊𝑊𝐺𝐺𝑊𝑊𝑚𝑚 = 100  holds for each household. The 
deviation of these indicators from parity (i.e., 50) can be used to test the statistical significance of 
the gender gap in decision making for control and workload.  
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To test hypothesis 5, we used multivariate regression analysis. Since access to the sheller was not 
randomised the results are open to sample selection bias. To reduce this bias, we used matching 
techniques.  
Rosenbaum and Rubin (1983) suggest that it suffices to match individuals based on balancing 
score measures, such as the propensity score, as opposed to the vector of observable covariates 
per se. A conditional probability of group membership (propensity score) is predicted from 
observed covariates by logistic (or probit) regression, to create a counterfactual group. To test for 
robustness, we employed different matching algorithms. In view of the small sample size, our 
first choice of matching algorithm was nearest one-neighbor matching (Becker & Ichino, 2002; 
Dehejia, 2005). For the nearest one-neighbor matching, matching without replacement is also 
considered. Without replacement (and a caliper), the variance of the estimator decreases since 
more information on the control group is used. However, the matched pairs can differ 
considerably in their propensity scores (Dehejia and Wahba, 2002). For the radius matching, 
there is no way of determining, a priori, an acceptable size for caliper (Smith and Todd, 2005), 
and the appropriate caliper that achieves a balance while minimizing the loss of observations and 
the variance of the estimator was found by trial and error. To confirm the validity of the 
matching we tested for covariate imbalance. Finally, the following regression model is estimated 
by including the households from the sheller group and the matched households from the non-
sheller groups: 
𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖 = 𝛽𝛽0 + 𝛽𝛽1𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽2𝐺𝐺𝑖𝑖 + 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖     (𝑖𝑖 ∈ 𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚ℎ𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒 𝑝𝑝𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝) 
where 𝑦𝑦 is women’s WGCI for groundnut, 𝑥𝑥 is a vector of covariates, 𝐺𝐺 is the group dummy (1 
for the sheller group, 0 otherwise), 𝜀𝜀 is the random error term, and 𝑖𝑖 refers to the household. As a 
measure of commercialization we used the area planted to groundnuts, since figures for 
production and sales were judged less reliable. Area planted to groundnut was significantly 
greater in the sheller group (p < .000). Lastly, 𝛽𝛽2 is designed to capture the average treatment 
effect on the treated (ATT) to be estimated.  
Unobserved variables that affect assignment into treatment and the dependent variable 
simultaneously can result in hidden bias to which matching estimators are not robust. We 
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followed the bounding approach proposed by Rosenbaum (2002) and applied by DiPrete and 
Gangl (2004) and Becker and Caliendo (2007).  Sig+ (p-value) is obtained from Wilcoxon 
signed rank tests for the ATT while setting the level of hidden bias to a certain value Γ, which 
reflects our assumption about unmeasured heterogeneity or endogeneity in treatment assignment 
expressed in terms of the odds ratio of differential treatment assignment due to an unobserved 
covariate. At each Γ a hypothetical significance level is calculated, which represents the bound 
on the significance level of the treatment effect in the case of endogenous self-selection into 
treatment status. By comparing the Rosenbaum bounds at different levels of Γ we can assess the 
strength that unmeasured influences would require in order that the estimated ATT would have 
arisen purely through selection effects.  
4. Results  
4.1 Hypothesis 1: Women have greater control over groundnuts than other field crops   
Figure 3 compares the weighted scores for women’s perceptions of control over eight key 
decisions for groundnuts, sunflower, maize, and cotton. The left hand panel presents results from 
the FGDs while the right hand panel shows results from the household survey. In terms of crops, 
women perceived they had less control over cotton, but felt they controlled all the major 
decisions over groundnuts. Control over maize was evenly shared between women and men. In 
terms of method, women in FGDs perceived greater differences in control than women 
interviewed in the household survey. However, the difference between cotton and groundnut for 
the household survey was highly significant for all eight decisions (p–value for the paired t-test < 
0.001) so in this respect the qualitative and quantitative results were similar. 
INSERT FIGURE 3 HERE 
4.2 Hypothesis 2: Men and women disagree over the level of women’s control 
Figure 4 shows that for groundnuts women perceived themselves as having more control (blue 
line), while men perceived women as having less control (red line). For cotton, women perceived 
themselves as having minimal control, whereas men perceived women as having more control. 
In terms of method, both FGDs and the household survey gave similar results. However, women 
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in FGDs perceived they had greater control over groundnuts, and less control over cotton than 
did women in the household survey. 
INSERT FIGURE 4 HERE 
Table 1 presents the result of the paired t-test on the difference between women’s control 
perceived by women and women’s control perceived by men. The test compared the difference 
between OWGCIf and 100 - OWGCIm. The difference was statistically significant in all cases. 
Thus, women believed that they had more control over decision-making than men thought they 
had.  
INSERT TABLE 1 HERE 
4.3 Hypothesis 3: The higher women’s share of the workload, the greater women’s control of the 
crop 
Table 2 compares the correlation between perception of their share of the workload (GSWf) for 
maize and groundnuts with perception of their degree of control over these crops, as measured by 
their total control (WGCIf) and their control over the use of income. Workload was positively 
correlated with total control and control over use of income. For women, the correlation between 
their share of the workload and their control was statistically significant for both maize and 
groundnuts, suggesting that women’s workload did confer some degree of control. For men, the 
correlation between workload and control was statistically significant for maize but not for 
groundnuts in either type of control. 
INSERT TABLE 2 HERE 
4.4 Hypothesis 4: Women maintain control over groundnuts by conceding men’s control over 
cotton 
Table 3 shows the magnitude and statistical significance of correlation between women’s control 
over groundnuts and men’s control over maize and cotton, as perceived by men and women. The 
relationship is negative and statistically significant, implying that the higher women’s control 
over groundnuts, the higher their control over maize and cotton. The same applies to men’s 
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perception as well. This suggests there is no reciprocity between women’s control over 
groundnuts and men’s control over cotton. 
INSERT TABLE 3 HERE 
4.5 Hypothesis 5: Machine shelling and commercialisation of groundnuts does not reduce 
women’s control  
Table 4 presents the outcome of the balancing test and the estimates on ATT for  different 
matching methods. For algorithms (6), (7), and (9), bandwidth=0.002, caliper=0.06, and 
caliper=10 are used, respectively. In general, the estimates of ATT are found to be statistically 
significant and positive, indicating that the sheller leads to an increase in WGCIf for groundnut 
by an approximate range of 5 to 8. This suggests that the machine sheller increased women’s 
control over groundnuts. The sign of the bias is negative, meaning that the estimator without 
matching underestimates the effect of the treatment. Among the PSM algorithms the nearest 1 
neighbor without replacement (2) gave the best match, and the ATT estimator is statistically 
highly significant.  
 
INSERT TABLE 4 HERE 
Table 5 shows the results of the matched regression using the selected matching algorithm. The 
women’s Weighted Gender Control Index (WGCIf) is positively related to membership of a 
sheller group, and the coefficient is statistically significant at the 5 % level. This implies that the 
machine sheller increases women’s control over groundnuts. Other covariates also significantly 
affect women’s control. The results suggest that women in polygamous households have greater 
control over groundnuts, while higher rates of adoption of improved seeds reduce women’s 
control, perhaps because men in such households are more actively involved in farming 
decisions. 
INSERT TABLE 5 HERE 
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Although the area planted to groundnuts is a key determinant of receipt of treatment (i.e., 
provision of machine shellers), its effect on women’s control is not statistically significant. 
Moreover, replacing area planted to groundnuts with the volume of groundnuts sold also gives an 
insignificant coefficient (p=0.307). This suggests that the commercialisation of groundnuts does 
not reduce women’s control. In terms of specific decisions, women with access to the sheller 
perceived they had greater control over land preparation (p=0.0976), weeding (p=0.0167), 
harvesting (p=0.0016), and the use of income (p=0.0296) from groundnuts (Orr et. al., 2014b). 
Hence, post-harvest mechanisation increased women’s operational and financial control but 
strategic control (area planted) remained under male control. 
Table 6 summarises the Rosenbaum bounds for the ATT. The critical level of Γ at which we 
would have to question the identified ATT is between 1.9 and 2.0, i.e. if an unobserved covariate 
caused the odds ratio of treatment assignment to differ between the treatment and control groups 
by a factor of about 2.0. For the selected algorithm, it would require a hidden bias of Γ between 
1.2 and 1.3 to render the ATT spurious.  
INSERT TABLE 6 HERE 
5. Discussion   
5.1 Mixed methods 
Although both methods identified groundnuts as a ‘women’s crop’, the FGDs gave more extreme 
results (Figure 3). Similarly, women in FGDs justified their control over groundnuts by claiming 
reciprocity with men’s control over cotton. If a woman wants to plant 50 kg of groundnut seed, 
men won’t allow it and say it’s too much, but they will plant 50 kg of cotton seed. So we don’t 
allow then to deny us, since we don’t deny them for cotton (Kapenya) vii. However, the household 
survey revealed that women with greater control over groundnuts also had greater control over 
cotton and maize (Table 3).  
We offer three explanations for these differences. First, women in FGDs may have exaggerated 
their control over groundnuts. Although researchers consider FGDs informal, for villagers they 
are in fact a formal, very public arena, where the views expressed are normative (what ‘ought to 
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be’) rather than ‘what is’ (Mosse, 1994). We make a bowl of peanut butter for the men and the 
children. The rest is for us. It’s our money (Kapenya). Men come with a bleeding heart, not 
forcibly, but know that if they come humbly their wife will increase the amount of money from 
groundnuts she will give them. (Kazingizi). FGDs therefore offered women a highly public 
opportunity to defend their ‘right’ to control over groundnuts as a ‘women’s crop’.  
Secondly, women in FGDs may have experienced an energising sense of power as a group, 
encouraging them to challenge the status quo to meet their need for greater control. This reflects 
the empowering effect of women’s groups. Alternatively, women may have faced group pressure 
to exaggerate their right to control. ‘Women’ are not a homogeneous group. Some may have felt 
compelled to show solidarity with others or been influenced by more vocal members of the 
group, or deferred to older, better-off members with more to lose if they lost control over 
groundnuts. The ‘Asch effect’, where members subordinate their own judgement to that of the 
group, is well known to social psychologists (Asch, 1955).viii Although Participatory Rural 
Appraisal (PRA) relies heavily on small groups, it has paid scant attention to the importance of 
group dynamics. ix Using FGDs to resolve conflicts of interest remains ‘a frontier for 
participatory methods’ (Chambers, 1994). Where gender rights are at stake, the social dynamics 
of FGDs may polarise perceptions of control. 
Finally, women in FGDs might have downplayed their control over cotton to legitimize their 
right to groundnuts. No matter what you say, cotton is up to the men (Kapenya). You can’t even 
say anything about hired labour for cotton, it’s a man’s crop. That’s the way marriages end 
(Kazingizi). As for control of cotton sales, We can’t even try (Kapenya). Cotton gives ownership 
of money to go and drink beer and even marry another wife (Kapenya). Women’s role was 
simply to provide labour. You can work a few days on the groundnuts but the rest of the time you 
need to weed cotton. You can’t even say anything (Kazingizi).  
Mixed methods often produce contrasting or even conflicting results (Davis and Baulch, 2011). 
Previous studies on gendered decision-making have noted discrepancies between FGDs and 
individual interviews (von Bulow, 1992). Quantitative data on household decision-making are 
‘simple windows on complex realities’ that show the direction of control rather than exact 
measurements (Kabeer, 1999: 447). As one participant explained, decisions about control are 
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‘bedroom decisions’ – a private matter between husbands and wives. The value of the FGDs, 
therefore, was not to confirm the quantitative data but to make ‘bedroom’ decisions visible and 
highlight normative views on ‘women’s crops’. 
5.2 Commercialisation and gender relations 
To our surprise, women perceived that the machine sheller increased their control, while 
commercialisation (in the form of increased area planted or volume of sales) did not significantly 
change their control (Table 5). Women in EPFC groups with access to the sheller had greater 
levels of control over key decisions like harvesting and use of crop income (Orr et al., 2014b). 
The explanation may be that these women were members of commercial seed-producer groups, 
which had empowered them and given women greater control than if they were growing 
groundnuts individually.  
FGDs provide additional insights. Machine shelling significantly reduced women’s workload. A 
machine sheller did the work of 20 women in one day.x However, mechanisation also opened the 
door to men’s control.  Men got interested in the machine. Women will shell one bag a day then 
stop and do household chores, but men can spend the whole day shelling 20 bags. When it was 
shelled by hand, men had no control (Kagunda). However, women had no objection to sharing 
control for shelling. Women decide to use the groundnut sheller because they know that men will 
not help shell by hand. While women cook, men can be busy doing the shelling (Kagunda).  Thus, 
women growers were happy to relinquish some control over shelling in exchange for male 
labour. In addition to shelling, men now searched for improved seed, checked if groundnuts were 
ready for harvesting, and provided a bicycle or ox-cart to take groundnuts to market.  
Men exerted strategic control over groundnuts through their right to land. Eastern Province lies 
within Africa’s ‘matrilineal belt’, where marriage is uxorilocal and land is inherited from mother 
to daughter (Lancaster, 1976). However, when Chipata district was re-settled in 1941, rights to 
land were vested in male village headmen who gave usufruct rights to male heads of household 
(Pletcher, 1979; Skjonsberg, 1989). Consequently, marriage was usually virilocal and land was 
owned by men, giving them control over the area planted to groundnuts. Although women did 
not challenge this right, they argued that increasing the area planted to groundnuts would benefit 
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the household as a whole. We don’t come with land but if we have control of land other decisions 
will be easier to make” (Kazingizi). You cannot talk of cash income from groundnuts if you don’t 
have control over land (Kazingizi). Higher prices for groundnuts had made men more receptive 
to this argument, but they also used increasing women’s access to land as a bargaining chip to 
claim greater control over income from groundnuts.  
Women resisted these claims on the grounds of their greater workload. Few men pay attention to 
the groundnuts field. When you work there, that’s when your husband takes a bath and goes to 
drink beer. (Kapenya). There was a significant correlation between women’s perceived share of 
the workload and their control (Table 2). In women’s minds, therefore, ‘women’s crops’ were 
associated with women’s labour. Although women were scathing about men’s share of the 
workload, nevertheless we found no evidence of a gender division of labour for groundnuts.  
Women were therefore engaged in a difficult balancing act: keeping their ‘right’ to control over 
groundnuts while using men’s labour to reduce their own workload, which in turn exposed them 
to male ‘claims’ for greater control. But women were in no doubt that they had the best of the 
bargain. Men now do shelling. They never used to do that. Men never used to help us but now 
they know there’s money, they have joined us, so we are very happy (Kazingizi). Thus, women 
saw their reduced control over shelling as a welcome liberation from drudgery. 
5.3 Women’s crops and the power to name 
‘Women’s crops’ are part of a wider system of beliefs on gender roles. Among the matrilineal 
Chewa, crop agriculture was historically the concern of women (Morris, 1988). Although 
inheritance in our survey area was no longer matrilineal, the older culture was reflected in 
traditional beliefs about gender roles. Women were responsible for the daily meal and for the 
relish crops. Responsibility for maize, the staple food crop, was shared between men and women. 
Men were responsible for providing cash for essential items and for buying maize when stocks 
ran out.xi In the settler economies of eastern Africa where the colonial state limited the export 
crops that Africans could grow, the main source of cash income was employment on commercial 
farms. In Zambia, the association of cash income with men goes back at least to the colonial 
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period, when the imposition of hut tax forced men to supply labor for wages on white-owned 
farms and mines (Pletcher, 1979). Cash became a male domain.xii 
Women in FGDs echoed these traditional beliefs. Groundnuts are a food, so we control food for 
the household (Kapenya). Maize is a critical crop. If a man decides not to keep some bags to eat, 
it’s his responsibility to find piece-work to earn cash to buy maize (Kapenya). When we need 
income quickly, we decide to use the sheller. The man is responsible for bringing in cash income 
(men’s FGD, Kagunda). Men have to make sure there’s money in the house. That’s why they’re 
interested in groundnuts (Kazingizi). Hence, the conjugal contract served as a reference point 
both for women defending their right to groundnuts and for men staking claims to the cash from 
groundnut sales.   
Commercialisation threatens the conjugal contract because it reverses traditional gender roles. 
Women now find themselves growing a cash crop that rivals cotton. By insisting that groundnuts 
should remain a ‘women’s crop’, women were usurping male identity.  Preserving the conjugal 
contract therefore means re-thinking the status of groundnuts as a ‘women’s crop’. For some 
men, the solution is to make groundnuts a ‘men’s crop’. According to the men’s FGD in 
Kagunda, Groundnuts are not necessarily a women’s crop because it fetches a higher price than 
cotton. For others, the solution was to make groundnuts a crop for both women and men. It used 
to be a woman’s crop. Now it’s a crop for everyone (men in plenary, Kagunda). Women, on the 
other hand, were torn between wanting to retain control and the knowledge that without access to 
male labour they cannot reap the full benefits of commercialisation. They rationalised this by an 
ideology of altruism, seeing it as the price they must pay to bring greater benefits for the family. 
We thank men for coming in to help growing groundnuts, we can go higher and higher (plenary, 
Kazingizi). Nevertheless, the idiom they used was still one of men ‘helping’ women rather than 
being treated as equal partners. 
The ‘power to name’ uses a set of attributes that classify crops according to cultural beliefs about 
gender roles. When hybrid maize was first introduced in Zambia it was named a ‘man’s crop’ 
because its poor taste and storage qualities made it more suitable for sale (Geisler, 1993). 
Likewise, improved cowpea in northern Ghana became a ‘man’s crop’ because chemical sprays 
required a knowledge of ‘medicine’ that belonged to men (Padmanabhan, 2007). Women in 
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FGDs identified four attributes of women’s crops in Zambia: (1) ‘no market’ (ie. low prices) (2) 
little labour by men (3) used as a relish to supplement the meal and (4) required patience because 
they  were shelled or picked from a pod. While men may not succeed in re-naming groundnuts as 
a ‘men’s crop’ (based on the ‘male’ attribute of high market prices), they may succeed in re-
naming groundnuts as somehow gender-neutral, like maize. Groundnuts are now the main cash 
crop. Husbands have to decide with their wives how to use the income from groundnuts. The 
decision has to be made jointly. Men deciding alone would mean the end of the marriage (men’s 
FGD, Kagunda). Re-naming groundnuts as ‘a crop for everyone’ leaves open the thorny question 
of ‘the power to name’ and ultimate control.  
Framing the relationship between commercialisation and gender in terms of ‘women’s crops’ 
conceptualizes commercialisation as a zero sum game.  The impact of commercialization on 
gender is evaluated by investigating changes in women’s autonomy, or their degree of control. 
However, these categories are finite. One person’s loss of autonomy is another’s gain.  There can 
only be winners and losers. This outcome is reflected in  language, with commercialisation 
portrayed in military metaphors as a gender ‘conflict’ where men and women contest ‘terrain’, 
establish ‘beach-heads’ and turn households into ‘battlegrounds’ (Carney and Watts, 1991). As 
we have seen, this narrative of commercialisation and gender which combines both Marxist and 
feminist perspectives, originates with irrigated rice in The Gambia, and its magnetic pull is hard 
to resist. Yet while women groundnut growers in Zambia expressed views that fitted this 
narrative they also expressed views that did not.  
Commercialisation can also be viewed as a non-zero sum game, where women and men 
cooperate to raise the total income for the household. In particular, women seemed prepared to 
trade some degree of autonomy in exchange for greater male participation in shelling 
groundnuts. We expected women to see male involvement as a threat. Instead, they saw it as 
freeing them from drudgery. Moreover, by relieving this post-harvest bottleneck, women saw 
male participation in shelling as an opportunity to increase income for the whole household. This 
suggests that women did not see groundnuts as a zero sum game, and were willing to bargain and 
negotiate, welcoming greater male participation while seeking to retain operational and financial 
control.   
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In some cases, bargaining has proved an effective way for women to retain control as ‘women’s 
crops’ become commercialised (Sorensen, 1996). In eastern Africa women’s bargaining power 
rests primarily on their labour power. If a man just keeps and spends his money, women will not 
cultivate his [cotton] field next season (Bwanunkha). If my wife doesn’t agree, we cannot grow 
cotton (Kagunda). On the other hand, this power is weakened by the consequences of divorce if 
they insist on retaining full control (Dolan, 2001; Lim et. al., 2007).  Disputes over the meaning 
of ‘women’s crops’ may therefore be determined by mutual interest rather than by outright 
victory for one side. As happened with women’s vegetable gardens in The Gambia, what starts 
as a war of words over ‘the power to name’ can end in a compromise that leaves women with a 
significant degree of control (Schroeder, 1996). This suggests new research questions. How 
much autonomy are women groundnut growers in Zambia women willing to trade in order to 
increase overall household income? Do women really have a choice? How much control would 
satisfy men if overall income increased? What bargain would satisfy both parties? Why does 
bargaining apparently work in some contexts but not in others?  
6. Conclusion  
Our results confirmed that in Zambia’s Eastern Province groundnuts was a ‘women’s crop’. 
FGDs showed greater perceived gender differences in control than found in a household survey. 
We attribute this to group dynamics in FGDs, which provided a public forum for women to 
defend rights and men to stake claims over groundnuts. The strong emotions aroused in FGDs 
reflected the threat that commercialization posed to traditional gender roles and the conjugal 
contract. 
Contrary to expectation, women did not perceive that commercialisation reduced their level of 
control over groundnuts. In fact, women with access to a machine sheller reported higher levels 
of control for key decisions, including control over the use of income from groundnuts. Women 
welcomed men’s participation in machine shelling, which reduced the drudgery of hand shelling. 
In exchange for greater participation by men, women seemed willing to surrender some degree 
of their control over the crop. 
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The dominant narrative sees commercialisation as a zero sum game where men or women 
struggle for autonomous control. This is only part of the story. Women groundnut growers in 
Zambia also saw commercialisation as a non-zero sum game in which greater cooperation 
between men and women could benefit the household as a whole. It is not our intention to 
replace the current narrative of commercialisation and gender with one based on cooperation 
rather than conflict. Rather, we see room for both depending on the specific historical context 
and variations in women’s bargaining power. Which narrative will prevail is an empirical 
question. In the present case, commercialisation looks set to change the status of groundnuts in 
Zambia as a ‘women’s crop’, reducing women’s operational and financial control, but women 
may consider this a price worth paying if they can negotiate shared control over a bigger cash 
income. 
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Table 1. Paired t-test on perceived difference in women’s control 
  
N 
Women's Control 
Mean  
Difference 
t- 
statistic 
p- 
value Women's 
perception 
Men's 
perception 
Maize 287 42.9 35.6 7.3 8.5 0.000 
Groundnut 286 47.7 39.1 8.6 9.3 0.000 
Cotton 206 39.4 34.1 5.3 6.2 0.000 
Sunflower 183 45.0 43.1 1.9 2.9 0.004 
 
Source: Household Survey, 2014 
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Table 2. Correlation between shares of workload and control in farming of maize and 
groundnuts 
 
a Pearson’s coefficient of correlation. 
  
 Gender Control Maize Groundnuts 
Women 
Total control 0.462 
a 0.278 
p = 0.000 p = 0.000 
Control over use of income 0.222 0.269 p = 0.001 p = 0.000 
Men 
Total control  0.111 0.032 p= 0.061 p = 0.596 
Control over use of income 0.157 0.095 p = 0.012 p = 0.116 
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Table 3. Correlation between women’s control over groundnuts with men’s control over 
maize and cotton 
  Women's control over groundnut vs. 
  Men's control over maize Men's control over cotton 
Women's  
perception 
- 0.760 a -0. 587 
p = 0.000 p = 0.000 
Men's  
perception 
 - 0.753 - 0.497 
p = 0.000 p = 0.000 
 
a Pearson’s coefficient of correlation 
  
27 
 
 
 
 
  
 
   
Table 4. Average Treatment Effect on the Treated (ATT) with alternative matching 
algorithms 
Matching Algorithm 
Propensity 
Score Type 
Pseudo 
R2 
LR χ2 
(p-value) 
Mean  
Standardized 
Bias 
Sample Size 
on Common 
Support 
ATT  
(p-value) 
Treated Control 
(0) Before matching - 0.120 
40.67 
(p=0.000)*** 
19.368 89 176 
5.001 
(p=0.005)*** 
(1) 
A
fte
r m
at
ch
in
g 
Nearest 1 neighbour Logit 0.041 
9.83 
(p=0.631) 
12.912 86 176 
5.669 
(p=0.033)** 
(2) 
Nearest 1 neighbour 
without replacement 
Logit 0.032 
3.65 
(p=0.989) 
6.256 86 176 
6.530 
(p=0.002)*** 
(3) Nearest 1 neighbour Probit 0.066 
15.54 
(p=0.213) 
13.099 85 176 
7.557 
(p=0.003)*** 
(4) 
Nearest 1 neighbour 
without replacement 
Probit 0.020 
4.68 
(p=0.968) 
9.605 85 176 
5.338 
(p=0.013)** 
(5) Nearest 2 neighbours Logit 0.013 
3.10 
(p=0.995) 
6.468 86 176 
7.890 
(p=0.001)*** 
(6) 
Kernel 
(bandwidth=0.002) 
Logit 0.028 
6.50 
(p=0.889) 
8.947 86 176 
6.586 
(p=0.005)*** 
(7) Radius (caliper=0.06) Logit 0.008 
1.75 
(p=1.000) 
4.634 84 176 
5.558 
(p=0.006)*** 
(8) Mahalanobis - 0.078 
19.24 
(p=0.083)* 
15.605 89 176 
5.948 
(p=0.016)** 
(9) 
Mahalanobis with 
caliper (=10) 
- 0.088 
18.32 
(p=0.106) 
11.778 75 176 
4.763 
(p=0.065)* 
***, **, and * indicates statistical significance at 1, 5, and 10 %  levels, respectively. 
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Table 5. Result of Matching Regression (nearest 1 neighbor without replacement) 
 
Dependent Variable: Women’s Gender Control Index (WGCIf) for groundnuts  
Treatment Variable: Sheller Group (yes=1) 
Matched 
Regression Variable Coefficient t-statistic p-value 
F (13, 158) = 2.58 Sheller Group (yes=1) 6.56 3.17 0.002 
p-value = 0.003 Area planted to groundnuts 1.82 1.37 0.172 
R2 = 0.175 Spouses of same religion (yes=1) 0.88 0.41 0.681 
  
Husband has official position in 
EPFC group (yes=1) -2.00 -0.53 0.594 
  
Wife has official position in EPFC 
group (yes=1) 1.80 0.48 0.632 
  Polygamy (yes=1) 10.71 2.31 0.022 
  Sum of age 0.11 2.00 0.047 
  
Gap in age (age of husband – age 
of wife) -0.37 -1.79 0.076 
  Sum of experience with groundnuts -0.11 -1.42 0.157 
  
Gap in experience with groundnuts 
Experience of husband – 
experience of wife) 
0.09 0.28 0.782 
  Household size -0.37 -0.74 0.462 
  Household adult female ratio -31.60 -1.71 0.089 
  
Area planted to improved seed, all 
crops (%) -8.57 -2.16 0.033 
    Constant 59.69 5.68 0.000 
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Table 6. Rosenbaum bounds for the ATT 
 
Matching Algorithm Γ sig+ sig- t-hat+ t-hat- CI+ CI- 
(2) Nearest 1 neighbor without replacement 
1.2 0.029 0.000 3.846 6.759 -0.120 10.894 
1.3 0.056 0.000 3.278 7.525 -0.614 11.685 
 
N = 86 matched pairs 
gamma  - log odds of differential assignment due to unobserved factors 
sig+   - upper bound significance level 
sig-   - lower bound significance level 
t-hat+ - upper bound Hodges-Lehmann point estimate 
t-hat- - lower bound Hodges-Lehmann point estimate 
CI+    - upper bound confidence interval (a = 0.95) 
CI-    - lower bound confidence interval (a = 0.95) 
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Figure 1: Conceptual framework for ‘women’s crops’ 
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Figure 1: The ‘Women’s Crop Tool’ 
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Figure 3: Women’s perceptions of control over groundnuts, cotton, maize, and sunflower in Eastern Province, Zambia 
(weighted scores) 
 
  
Source: Focus Group Discussions and Household Survey, 2014 
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Figure 4: Contrasting perceptions of women’s control for groundnuts and cotton, by sex, Eastern Province, Zambia (weighted 
scores) 
 
  
  
Source: Focus Group Discussions and Household Survey, 2014 
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i  Besides Carney and Watts (1990, 1991) cited above, see also the studies by Dey (1981, 1982), by von Braun and 
Webb (1989) not to mention Carney (1988, 1992 and 1998).  
ii Although researchers have challenged Boserup’s thesis on several fronts ‘they have not dislodged the fundamental 
premise that female labour is central to African agriculture’. (Bryceson 1995: 7). 
iii Carney and Watts (1990) article, Manufacturing Dissent, was a play on Herman and Chomsky’s Manufacturing 
Consent (1988), which examined the influence of the media on public opinion. 
iv For a fuller description of this tool and applications, see Orr et. al., (2014b). For a similar tool applied in a 
different context see Shrestha (2002). 
v The villages were Kagunda and Mafuta (commercial + sheller), Bwanunkha and Kapenya (commercial) and 
Kazingizi and Stephen (non-commercial). All were located in Chipata district except for Bwanunkha which was 
located in Chadisa district. 
vi Other Chichewa words suggested by participants included kulongola (‘lead or go before’), kudongosola (‘arrange 
or speak in order’), and ndondomekho (‘following an agreed plan or procedure’). For the English definitions of 
kulamulira and kulongola, see Guerin (1985), sv; for kudongosola, see Scott (1965), sv; and for ndondomekho, see 
Pass (2013), sv.  
vii The name of the village where the FGD was conducted is given in parentheses. All quotations are from women 
FGDs unless otherwise specified. 
viii The original Asch experiment involved a group of seven to nine men, of whom all but one were primed give the 
incorrect answer. Group pressure resulted in incorrect answers by the minority group member in 32 % of cases. 
Further experiments revealed that the minority member gave the same percentage of incorrect answers when the 
majority against them was only three to one (Asch, 1955). 
ix A trawl through all 66 volumes of the journal Participatory Learning and Action failed to discover a single study 
of how group dynamics affected the results from FGDs. 
x The machine sheller used by EPFC seed producer groups is operated by three people and can shell four 50 kg bags 
in one hour or 32 50 kg bags in a working day of eight hours, averaging 533 kg per person. In one eight-hour day a 
woman can shell 25 kg by hand. Thus, in one working day the machine sheller does the work of 20 women. Farm 
Management data from Eastern Province in the 1970s show that it required 2,426 hours ha-1 to cultivate groundnuts, 
of which 950 hours (39%) was spent on shelling (Skjonsberg, 1989, p. 46 note 9). 
xi Our main source for traditional gender roles and responsibilities in the survey area was the 1977 study of Kefa 
village (Skjonsberg, 1989: 37-38, 83, 88). Kefa is located 30 km from Chipata town, compared to an average of 50 
km for our survey villages. For similar traditions in other parts of Zambia, see Geisler (1993) for the southern region 
and Crehan (1983) for the north-west. We use the label ‘traditional’ in a restrictive sense because pre-colonial views 
of gender roles may have been very different (von Bulow, 1992). 
xii This sometimes worked to women’s advantage. Women in Malawi resisted attempts by the colonial state to make 
them sell groundnuts for cash in order to pay hut tax, because this payment was a male responsibility. They 
continued to sell groundnuts to Indian traders, but for cloth (Bezner-Kerr, 2010). 
35 
 
                                                          
